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Kaplan: Drawing Lines around the Fourth Amendment: Robbins v. California

NOTES

DRAWING LINES AROUND THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT: ROBBINS V. CALIFORNIA AND
NEW YORK V. BELTON
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-

pers, and effects against unreasonablesearches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable

cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularlydescribing the place to be searched,and the person or thing to be seized.'

No. student of the fourth amendment would seriously dispute
the statement that the amendment has produced a "branch of law
[that] is something less than a seamless web.' ' In Robbins v. Californias and New York v. Belton," the Supreme Court yet again attempted to clarify fourth amendment jurisprudence by adopting a
bright line test to determine the constitutionality of any automobile
search.
Specifically, the Supreme Court in Robbins addressed the issue
of "whether closed containers found during a lawful warrantless
search of an automobile may themselves be searched without a warrant," 5 and, in Belton, addressed the issue of whether the scope of
the search incident to the arrest of an occupant of an automobile
includes "the passenger compartment of the automobile in which he
was riding."' Although the facts of the two cases were remarkably
similar,7 the Court found the warrantless search in Robbins to be
1.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 440 (1973).
101 S. Ct. 2841 (1981)(plurality).
101 S. Ct. 2860 (1981).
101 S. Ct. at 2844.
101 S. Ct. at 2861.
See 101 S. Ct. at 2855 (Stevens, J., dissenting); text accompanying notes 14-18, 29-
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unconstitutional and the search in Belton to be constitutionally permissible. In so holding, the Supreme Court abandoned numerous
fourth amendment doctrines, including a longstanding analysis of
each case's "own facts and circumstances," 8 the principle that the
scope of a search "must be 'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible," 9 and the doctrine that the fourth amendment protects the legitimate expectations
of privacy of "people not places." 10
In place of these doctrines and analyses, the Court in both cases
adopted bright line tests intended to be capable of easy application
by the courts and law enforcement personnel.1 Simply stated, the
Court held that if an opaque container or parcel not clearly announcing the presence of contraband is located in the trunk area of
an automobile, that container or parcel cannot be searched without a
warrant in the absence of circumstances that would trigger an exception to the fourth amendment's general warrant requirement.1 2 If,
however, a container is in the passenger compartment or interior of
an automobile, the container is automatically subject to a warrantless search incident to arrest.1 8
This note, after setting forth the factual backgrounds of Robbins and Belton, explores the reasoning of the Court, and of the concurring and dissenting opinions in both cases. Robbins and Belton
are then considered as they relate to the three major lines of cases
relevant to container searches: the automobile exception cases, the
luggage cases, and the search incident to arrest cases. The note concludes with a critique of the two holdings and suggests that the
Court adopt a case-by-case, factually sensitive analysis, which is responsive to established fourth amendment doctrine.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Robbins v. California
On the morning of January 5, 1975, California Highway Police
33 infra.
8. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931).
9. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968) (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310
(1967)(Fortas, J.,
concurring)).
10. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
11. See 101 S. Ct. at 2851 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); Belton, 101 S. Ct. at 2866 (Brennan, J.,dissenting).
12. Robbins, 101 S. Ct. at 2847. For a list of the generally recognized exceptions to the
search and seizure requirement, see note 46 infra.
13. Belton, 101 S.Ct. at 2865.
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Officers Ronald DePue and Richard Stoltz observed a 1966 Chevrolet station wagon being driven erratically. Jeffrey Robbins, the driver
and sole occupant of the car, pulled over on command and got out to
meet Officer DePue. When asked to produce his car registration,
however, Robbins was unable to find it in his wallet and so returned
to look for it in his car. Officer DePue followed Robbins back to the
station wagon and smelled marihuana smoke.14 He then arrested
Robbins for driving under the influence of marihuana and, after
finding no weapons on his person, handcuffed him.
Leaving Robbins with Officer Stoltz, Officer DePue then
searched the passenger area of the automobile. The search revealed
two tweezers, a hand-rolled cigarette butt, and a cookie tin containing rolling paper and one-eighth of an ounce of marihuana. 15 At this
point, Robbins allegedly told Officer Stoltz: "What you are looking
for is in the back."" The officers then placed Robbins in the rear of
the patrol car and opened the tailgate of the station wagon. Officer
DePue next lifted up the handle set flush in the deck and uncovered
a recessed baggage compartment. Inside this compartment were a
tote bag, two green plastic bags,17 a briefcase, and a pint glass jar.
The tote bag was then opened and three additional plastic bags removed. All of the plastic bags were found to contain marihuana.28
After his pre-trial motion to suppress the marihuana was denied, Robbins was convicted by a jury of possession of marihuana, 1 '
possession of marihuana for sale,20 and transportation of marihuana.2 1 The California Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction,
upholding the warrantless search of the luggage and sealed packages
14. 101 S. Ct. at 2843-44.
15. Brief for Petitioner at 5.
16. Id. at 6.
17. 101 S. Ct. at 2844. A description of the plastic bags, based on a photograph, described the bags as follows:
The package visible in the photograph is apparently wrapped or boxed in an opaque
material covered by an outer wrapping of transparent, cellophane-type plastic. (The
photograph is not in color, and the "green" plastic cannot be seen at all.) Both
wrappings are sealed on the outside with at least one strip of opaque tape. As thus
wrapped and sealed, the package roughly resembles an oversized, extra-long cigar
box with slightly rounded corners and edges. It bears no legend or other written
indicia supporting any inference concerning its contents.
People v. Robbins, 103 Cal. App. 3d 34, 44, 162 Cal. Rptr. 780, 785 (Ct. App. 1980)(Rattigan, J., dissenting).
18. Brief for Respondent at 8.
19. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11357 (West 1975 & Supp. 1980).
20. Id. § 11359.
21. Id.§ 11360.
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in the luggage compartment as within the rule that authorizes warrantless searches of automobiles and their contents upon probable
cause.22 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded 23 the case to the court of appeals in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Arkansas v.
Sanders.2 4

On remand, the California Attorney General conceded that the
searches of both the tote bag and the cookie tin were controlled by
Sanders and therefore invalid, but contended that the search of the
two plastic bags sitting separately in the trunk was properly conducted without a warrant. 25 The court of appeals again agreed in a
two-to-one opinion that the packages "did not support a reasonable
expectation of privacy." Furthermore, "[tlhe bulky tape-secured
packages do not present an appearance of containing anything other
than contraband. '20 One Justice dissented on the ground that there
was a reasonable expectation of privacy in the innocuous, unmarked
packages, which appeared to be "tightly wrapped for shipment by
mail, or to protect its contents, or for both purposes. ' 27 The United
States Supreme Court once again granted certiorari to determine the
constitutionality of the searches.28
22. Robbins v. People, No. 78-567, Slip op. at iv (Cal. Ct. App. May 9, 1978). According to Ronald Niver, Assistant Attorney General for the State of California, the California
Supreme Court denied a hearing without an opinion. Telephone interview with Ronald K.
Niver, Assistant Attorney General, State of California (December 11, 1981).
For a discussion of the automobile exception, see text accompanying notes 128-154 infra.
23. 443 U.S. 903 (1980).
24. 442 U.S. 753 (1980); see text accompanying notes 195-200 infra.
25. Brief for Petitioner at 11. The California Supreme Court again refused to grant a
hearing, with Chief Justice Bird and Justice Tobriner dissenting. See People v. Robbins, 103
Cal. App. 3d 34, 45, 162 Cal. Rptr. 780, 786 (Ct. App. 1980).
26. People v. Robbins, 103 Cal. App. 3d 34, 39-40, 162 Cal. Rptr. 780, 783 (1980),
rev'd, 101 S. Ct. 2841 (1981). The majority distinguished the relevant and arguably controlling case of Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), by the type of container in that case
(suitcase). 103 Cal. App. 3d at 39-40, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 783. The court also distinguished
Remers v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 659, 87 Cal. Rptr. 202, 470 P.2d 11 (1970), stressing the
common use of a tinfoil package for the legitimate purpose of wrapping food or tobacco. 103
Cal. App. 3d at 39-41, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 783-85.
27. People v. Robbins, 103 Cal. App. 3d 34, 44, 162 Cal. Rptr. 780, 785 (Ct. App.
1980) (Rattigan, J., disenting). Judge Rattigan went on to observe that:
[F]or all that I see, [the package] could contain books, stationery, canned goods, or
any number of other wholly innocuous items which might be heavy in weight. In
fact, it bears a remarkable resemblance to an unlabelled carton of emergency
highway flares that I bought from a store shelf and have carried in the trunk of my
own automobile.
Id, (Rattigan, J., dissenting).
28. 449 U.S. 1109 (1981).
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New York v. Belton
On April 9, 1978, New York State Trooper Douglas Nicot was
passed by a car travelling at approximately seventy-five miles an
hour in a fifty-five mile-per-hour speed zone. He gave chase and succeeded in pulling the automobile over. Trooper Nicot approached the
automobile and asked whether the driver or any of the three passengers had a license or registration.29 While at the automobile window,
Trooper Nicot smelled marihuana and saw on the front seat an envelope commonly used to carry the drug. He then placed all four
individuals (including Roger Belton, who was a passenger in the
back seat) under arrest for unlawful possession of marihuana.30
Trooper Nicot ordered the four men to leave the car and frisked
each one as he alighted. Because he had only one pair of handcuffs,
the officer placed the fouir men at different points around the automobile so that there could be no physical contact between them. 1
He then reentered the automobile and retrieved the envelope,
labeled "Supergold," from the front seat and a partially burned marihuana cigarette from the ashtray. Trooper Nicot next searched the
five jackets in the back seat by first patting the jackets' exteriors for
weapons 3 2 and, feeling none, by unzipping the pockets. In the zippered pocket of Roger Belton's jacket, the officer found a rolled-up
twenty dollar bill in which there was a substance later identified as
cocaine.3 3 He placed the jacket in his patrol car and drove the four
men to court for arraignment.
34
Belton was charged with possession of a controlled substance.
He unsuccessfully moved to suppress from evidence the cocaine
seized from his jacket pocket.35 Belton then pled guilty to a lesser
included offense" but preserved and exercised his right to appeal.
The appellate division unanimously affirmed the judgment,
holding that the search of Belton's jacket was a reasonable search
29.

New York v. Belton, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 2861 (1981).

30. Id. at 2861-62.
31. Brief for Petitioner at 3.
32. Id.
33. Id. Two marihuana cigarettes and a plastic bag containing a large amount of cocaine were also discovered in the jacket. Joint Appendix at A-21 to A-22.

34. People v. Belton, 68 A.D.2d 198, 199, 416 N.Y.S.2d 922, 923 (App. Div. 1979).
35.

Id.

36. Id. at 199, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 923-24. The lesser included offense was attempted possession of a controlled substance in the sixth degree, N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 220.06, 220.110
(McKinney 1980). See 68 A.D.2d at 199, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 923-24.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1982

5

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 2 [1982], Art. 8
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:483

incident to arrest.3 7 The Court of Appeals reversed the appellate di-

vision, holding that "[o]nce [the] defendant had been removed from
the automobile and placed under arrest, a search of the interiors of a
private receptacle safely within the exclusive custody and the control
of the police may not be upheld as [a search] incident to his arrest."3 Two judges dissented, taking issue with the majority's conclusion that the suspects and their property were in the exclusive
control of the police.3 ' Rather, the dissenters argued, one policeman
with four unknown suspects on a busy highway presented a "fluid
situation" which required a search of the jackets in order to protect
the officer and preserve evidence.40 The dissenters called for an honest assessment of the facts of the case and the degree to which the
arrestee and his property had actually come within the exclusive control of the police.41 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide
of Belton's jacket pocket was a proper search
whether the search
4
incident to arrest. '

37. People v. Belton, 68 A.D.2d 198, 200, 416 N.Y.S.2d 922, 925 (App. Div. 1979),
rev'd, 50 N.Y.2d 447, 407 N.E.2d 420, 429 N.Y.S.2d 574 (1980), rev'd, 101 S.Ct. 2860
(1981). Judge Moule relied in his decision, in part, on People v. DeSantis, 46 N.Y.2d 82, 385
N.E.2d 577, 412 N.Y.S.2d 838 (1978), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 912 (1979). De Santis held that
since the arrest itself constitutes a major intrusion, the intrusion caused by the ensuing search
of the arrestee and his possessions is essentially de minimus. Id. at 87, 385 N.E.2d at 579, 412
N.Y.S.2d at 840. For a discussion of the search incident to arrest exception, see text accompanying notes 261-302 infra.
38. People v. Belton, 50 N.Y.2d 447, 452, 407 N.E.2d 420, 423, 429 N.Y.S.2d 574, 577
(1980). The majority assessed the critical inquiry to be the "extent to which the arrestee may
gain access to the property rather than the time or spice between the arrest and search." Id.
at 451, 407 N.E.2d at 422, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 576 (citation omitted). In so holding, the court
overruled People v. De Santis, 46 N.Y.2d 82, 385 N.E.2d 577, 412 N.Y.S.2d 838 (1978), cert.
denied, 443 U.S. 912 (1979). See 50 N.Y.2d at 451 n.1, 407 N.E.2d at 422 n.l, 429 N.Y.S.2d
at 576 n.l. Thus considered, once property is within the exclusive control of the police, the
exigency dissipates, and a search of the property can no longer be viewed as incident to an
arrest. See Id.
39. People v. Belton, 50 N.Y.2d 447, 452, 407 N.E.2d 420, 423, 429 N.Y.S.2d 574, 578
(Gabrielli, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 454, 407 N.E.2d at 424, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 578 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting).
41. Judge Gabrielli stated:
Apparently the majority believes that since the suspects were standing outside the
car at the time of the search and had been told that they were under arrest, both
their persons and their property had thereby been conclusively and safely reduced to
the complete control of the officer, as a matter of law. Although one might well wish
that all criminal suspects could so readily be subdued as a matter of law, I cannot
agree with a decision that requires a police officer to stake his very life upon the
validity of such a questionable presumption.
Id. at 454-55, 407 N.E.2d at 425, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 579 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting).
42. 449 U.S. 1109 (1981).
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THE COURT'S REASONING

Robbins v. California

The search in Robbins was found to be unconstitutional. 43 Justice Stewart, writing for a plurality of the Court,44 held that unless a
closed opaque container "clearly announc[es] its contents" 45 or a
search of such a container falls under one of the other established
exceptions to the fourth amendment, 46 a warrant must be secured
before the container may be searched. In so holding, Justice Stewart
responded to three basic arguments: First, that a closed container
found in an automobile is subject to a warrantless search because it
is located in an automobile;47 second, that the nature of the

container may diminish its constitutional protection; 48 and third, that
the opaque bags at issue fell within the class of items subject to a
warrantless search because their contents could be inferred from
their outward appearance.49
Justice Stewart began by stating that the automobile exception"0 has no place in an analysis of container searches. Simply
stated, the automobile exception provides that a warrant to search an
automobile is unnecessary where probable cause exists that the car is
connected with criminal activity,51 and where the fleeting nature of
43. Robbins v. California, 101 S. Ct. 2841, 2847 (1981).
44. Id. at 2843 (Stewart, J., joined by Brennan, White & Marshall J.J.). Chief Justice
Burger concurred in the judgment witliout filing an opinion. Id. at 2847. Justice Powell while
concurring in the judgment wrote a separate opinion. Id. (Powell, J., concurring). Three separate dissents were filed. Id. at 2851 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id.(Rehnquist, J.,dissenting);
id. at 2855 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 2847.
46. Id. at 2847 n.3. The generally recognized exceptions to the fourth amendment
search warrant requirement are: consent searches, see, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218 (1973); hot pursuit, see, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); stop and
frisk, see, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); plain view, see, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); search incident to a lawful arrest, see, e.g., Chimel v. California,
395 U.1. 752 (1969)1 and automobile searches, see, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132 (1925).
47. 101 S. Ct. at 2844-45; see Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 22-23.
48. 101 S. Ct. at 2845-46.
49. Id. at 2846-47.
50. See text accompanying notes 128-154 infra.
51. 101 S. Ct. at 2844. Probable cause to search is present "if the facts and circumstances would persuade a reasonably prudent person that a crime has been committed and that
evidence of the crime can be found at the location to be searched." Note, The Automobile
Exception to the Warrant Requirement: Speeding Away From the Fourth Amendment, 82 W.
VA. L. REV. 637, 637 n.4 (1980); see Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Carroll
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 159-62 (1925). See generally Armentano, The Standardfor
Probable Cause Under the Fourth Amendment, 44 CONN. B.J. 137 (1970).
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the automobile makes the procurement of a warrant to search the
automobile impracticable and unreasonable; 52 that is, when either
the driver or confederates might circumvent law enforcement officials' attempts to secure the automobile by driving out of the jurisdicion while a search warrant is sought. Another argument, in lieu
of or in addition to the mobility of the automobile as obviating the
need for a warrant, is that the pervasive regulation of the automobile
bestows upon it a lesser expectation of privacy and, therefore, the
automobile is subject to a warrantless search upon probable cause
regardless of its mobility. "8
Justice Stewart held that neither the fleeting nature of the automobile nor the lesser expectation of privacy therein extends to
container searches." He answered the argument, advanced by the
United States Government 5 5 and dissenting Justices Blackmun5 and
Stevens,' 7 that the very placing of containers into an automobile reflects a failure to guard one's expectation of privacy as to those containers, by holding that the issue had been dispositively settled in
United States v. Chadwick"8 and Arkansas v. Sanders.59 Briefly,
Chadwick held that luggage, because of its primary function as a
"repository of personal effects," 60 carries a greater expectation of
privacy than does an automobile. Sanders held that the warrant requirement applies to "personal luggage taken from an automobile to
the same degree it applies to such luggage in other locations." 61 The
52.

Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925); cf. Coolidge v. New Hampshire,

403 U.S. 443 (1971)(warrant required where police had time to secure warrant and facts
indicated automobile was not going to be used); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970)(if

probable cause and exigency existed at time of seizure, it will be extended to subsequent
search at stationhouse). See generally Moylan, The Automobile Exceptiorn What It Is and
What It Is Not-A Rationale In Search of a ClearerLabel, 27 MERCER L. REV. 987, 1001-04

(1976).
53. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1977); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417
U.S. 583, 590-91 (1974).
54. 101 S. Ct. at 2845.

55.

Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 23 (citing United States v. Mackey,

626 F.2d 684, 687 (9th Cir. 1980)(special qualities of paper bag, combined with fact that bag

"stuffed under the seat of a car is naturally viewed as an item demanding or deserving no more
privacy than any other part of the automobile")).
56.

101 S. Ct. at 2851 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see text accompanying notes 92-100

Infra.
57.
Infra.
58.
59.
60.
61.

101 S. Ct. at 2855 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see text accompanying notes 92-100
433
442
433
442

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

1 (1977); see text accompanying notes 180-192 infra.
753 (1979); see text accompanying notes 195-200 infra.
at 13.
at 766.
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Sanders Court thus concluded that packages seized from an automobile are subject to an immediate, warrantless search only when their
outward appearance readily supports the inference that they contain
contraband.6
Having thus disposed of the automobile exception, Justice Stewart next addressed the contention that containers which are not common repositories of personal effects, such as the plastic bags in Robbins, merit less constitutional protection than luggage.6 3 He cited
circuit court cases which drew distinctions between sturdy and flimsy
containers,"' and held that such distinctions have no constitutional
basis.6 5 Rather, the critical inquiry under Chadwick and Sanders is
whether the defendant, in placing something within a container,
"had thereby reasonably 'manifested an expectation that the contents would remain free from public examination.' "6 Justice Stewart felt, moreover, that the objective criteria by which to distinguish
between the various types of containers would be "difficult if not impossible" 67 to determine and, therefore, the courts, constables, and
citizens would have little guidance as to which receptacles carry a
sufficient privacy interest so as to fall within the warrant
requirement. s
In support of his contention that "[w]hat one person may put
into a suitcase, another may put into a paper bag," 6 9 Justice Stewart
cited the recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit in United States v. Ross. 7 0 Ross invali62. Id. at 765 n.13.
63. 101 S. Ct. at 2845. The state proposed the rule that:
[i]f a reasonable person, in light of all the circumstances, has cause to believe that

the container in question is a repository of personal effects, then a warrantless
search is prohibited. If, however, there is no reason to believe that the container is a

receptacle of such articles, then probable cause alone is sufficient to justify the
search.
Brief for Respondent at 51. Posing a different test, the United States argued, as amicus, that
"insubstantial containers," such as plastic bags or paper cups, invoke less expectation of privacy than substantial containers, and that a warrant should therefore not be required where

the container is insubstantial. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 22-23.
64.

101 S. Ct. at 2846.

65.

Id.

66.

Id. (quoting Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 11). It should be noted, however, that the Court

did not determine whether a subjective or objective standard with regard to Robbins' expectation of privacy in the parcels should have been utilized.
67. Id.

68. Id.
69. Id.
70. 655 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1981)(en banc), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S.
Oct. 13, 1981)(No. 80-2209); see text accompanying notes 216-233, 319-321 infra.
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dated the warrantless search of a brown paper bag found in the
course of a lawful warrantless search of an automobile trunk. The
court in Ross held that a container or parcel could not be searched
unless it fell within the Sanders justification for an immediate
search; that is, there is no expectation of privacy in a container
where its very nature and appearance announce its contents.
By utilizing this concept of the ability to infer the contents of a
container, Justice Stewart next met the argument advanced in Sanders that "'[n]ot all containers and packages found by police during
the course of a search Will deserve the full protection of the Fourth
Amendment.' ,,73 Justice Stewart narrowly interpreted this phrase,
holding that the examples of such containers provided by the Court
in Sanders, including a gun case, a kit of burglar tools, and open
containers in plain view,7 4 were "the very model of exceptions which
prove the rule."75 Unlike the suitcase in Sanders,6 the paper bag in
Ross,7 7 and the plastic-wrapped parcels in Robbins, 78 the items listed
in Sanders clearly met the test that "a container must so clearly
announce its contents, whether by distinctive configuration, its trans'7
parency, or otherwise, that its contents are obvious to an observer. 9
Justice Powell concurred in the judgment on the ground that
the result was justified by Sanders and that Robbins specifically evi71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

655 F.2d at 1171.
Id. at 1170 (citing Sanders, 442 U.S. at 765 n.13).
101 S. Ct. at 2846 (quoting Sanders, 442 U.S. at 764 n.13).
Id. at 2864 (citing Sanders, 442 U.S. at 764-65 n.13).
Id.
442 U.S. at 766.
655 F.2d at 1171..

78.

101 S. Ct. at 2847.

79. Id. Justice Stewart went on to note that the evidence did not reliably indicate that
the package could only -have contained marihuana. Id. Additionally, the California Court of
Appeals opinion that the package containing marihuana was in the ken of any experienced
observer, People v. Robbins, 103 Cal. App. 3d 34, 40, 162 Cal. Rptr. 780, 783 (Ct. App.
1980), was found to be unsupported by the vague hearsay testimony of the arresting officer.
101 S. Ct. at 2847. This testimony was as follows:
Q. And just one further question: You stated in response to Mr. Ross' question,
when you first saw the brown tote bag there was nothing unusual about it: Nothing
unusual about these two plastic wrapped green blocks that attracted your attention?
A. I had previous knowledge of transportation of such blocks. Normally contraband
is wrapped this way, merely hearsay. I had never seen them before.
Q. You had heard contraband was packaged this way?
A. Yes.
Joint Appendix at 41. An interesting question is raised by the scope of the plain smell doctrine

and its possible applicability in this case. See text accompanying notes 259-260 infra.
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denced an expectation of privacy in the plastic-wrapped parcels. 80
He took exception, however, to the plurality's departure from the
Court's previous "basic concern with interests in privacy [and its
adoption of a] mechanical requirement for a warrant before police
may search any closed container."81 Justice Powell found the
mechanical rule neither supported by precedent 2 nor justified by a
balancing of the interests of law enforcement with the fourth amendment privacy interests of the individual. The rule's sole virtue, he
concluded, was "simplicity."'" Justice Powell was attracted to the
dissenters' 85 argument that the automobile exception should control
for a search of containers where probable cause exists to search the
automobile, as opposed to probable cause focused on a particular
item therein.86 He felt, however, that the sua sponte consideration of
87
the doctrine late in the term would be inappropriate.
Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Stevens dissented on three
grounds. The first, advanced by Justice Rehnquist, was that Robbins
presented yet another opportunity to discard the exclusionary rule.88
He argued that this rule places too great a burden on law enforcement personnel by suppressing evidence found during searches
which, though conducted in good faith, are later ruled illegal.89 Justice Rehnquist further argued that the exclusionary rule forces the
courts to "engraft subleties" onto the fourth amendment in order to
80.

101 S. Ct. at 2847 (Powell, J.,oconcurring).

81.

Id. at 2849 (Powell, J., concurring).

82.

Id. (Powell, J., concurring). Indeed, Justice Powell contended that Sanders explicitly

foreclosed application of mechanical rules by noting the difficulties that would attend the determination of privacy interests, and limiting the holding to only personal luggage. Id. (Powell,
J., concurring); see Sanders, 442 U.S. at 765 n.13.
83. 101 S. Ct. at 2849-50 (Powell, J., concurring). While no privacy interest would be
protected in, for example, a Dixie cup, the police would be forced to go through the timeconsuming process of securing a warrant, thereby removing police personnel from other law
enforcement tasks. Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
84. 101 S. Ct. at 2850 (Powell, J., concurring).
85.

Three Justices dissented. They are Justice Blackmun, id. at 2851 (Blackmun, J.,

dissenting), Justice Rehnquist, id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), and Justice Stevens, id. at 2855
(Stevens, J., dissenting).

86.

Id. at 2850 (Powell, J., concurring); see id. at 2855 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See

also Sanders, 442 U.S. at 766-68 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Interestingly, the Chief Justice

merely concurred in the Robbins judgment without opinion. 101 S. Ct. at 2847 (Burger, C.J.,
concurring in the judgment); see text accompanying notes 160-163 infra.
87.

101 S. Ct. at 2850-51 (Powell, J., concurring).

88. Id. at 2851-52 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see California v. Minjares, 443 U.S. 916
(1979)(Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of stay)(arguing that stay should be granted and
exclusionary rule overruled).
89.

See 101 S. Ct. at 2852 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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provide simple formulas by which police will know in advance how to
conduct a particular search legally. 90 He called for a recognition of
the reasonableness requirement of the fourth amendment as controlling, rather than "the judicially-created preference for a warrant."9 1
A position taken by all three dissenters was that the automobile
exception should be extended to encompass any items found inside
an automobile.92 While both Chadwick" and Sanders94 focused on
the probable cause as to the container itself, in Robbins probable
cause existed for the automobile generally. 95 Justice Stevens therefore argued that if a warrant had been issued to search the automobile, the police "surely would not need to return to the magistrate for
another warrant before searching the suitcase [found therein]." 9
Justice Rehnquist, in particular, argued that an expectation of privacy in a locked trunk or glove compartment is no less than the expectation of privacy in luggage in an automobile. 97 He viewed as
illogical the proposition that a trunk or glove compartment of an automobile should be deemed by law to carry less of an expectation of
privacy than luggage found in the same automobile. 98
The final dissenting argument, advanced by Justice Rehnquist,
was that an analysis of Robbins' particular expectation of privacy in
the plastic-wrapped parcels would conclude that no reasonable expectation of privacy existed." The facts of the case included the dis9

90.
91.

Id. at 2851 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2852 (Rehnquist, 3., dissenting).

92. Id. at 2851 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 2852-54 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id.
at 2855-58 (Stevens, J., dissenting); cf Sanders, 442 U.S. at 769 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(insofar as luggage is as mobile as automobile in which it is located and since expectation of
privacy attending luggage in automobile is no greater than locked glove compartment or trunk,
luggage, like automobile itself, should be susceptible to warrantless search).
93. 433 U.S. at 3-4 (footlocker); see text accompanying note 181 infra.
94. 442 U.S. at 755 (suitcase); see text accompanying note 196 infra.
95. 101 S. Ct. at 2843 (stop of automobile due to erratic driving); see text accompanying note 86 supra and notes 160-163 infra.
96. 101 S. Ct. at 2857 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 2853 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)(citing Sanders, 442 U.S. at 769 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting)).
98. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)(citing Sanders, 442 U.S. at 769 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting)).
99. 101 S. Ct. at 2854 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In fact, Justice Rehnquist agreed
with Justice Blackmun's dissenting argument in Sanders that determining the reasonable expectation of privacy in differing types of containers would provide the police and the courts
with difficult, if not impossible, questions. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 771-72 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Like Justice Blackmun, Justice Rehnquist would have drawn the bright line at the other
extreme to the effect that anything found in an automobile is itself subject to a warrantless
search. 101 S. Ct. at 2854 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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covery of marihuana in the front seat, Robbins' inculpatory statement that the police should check the trunk, and the discovery of
plastic bags wrapped around something in a manner commonly used
to wrap contraband. Justice Rehnquist argued that these facts not
only demonstrated a diminished expectation of privacy, but in view
of all the other facts and circumstances, rendered the contents of the
parcels readily inferrable from their outward appearance. 00
New York v. Belton
In Belton, Justice Stewart, writing for a majority of the Court, 10 1
held the search of Belton's jacket to be constitutional as incident to a
lawful arrest. 2 The jacket was deemed to have been in Belton's immediate control because it was located in the passenger compartment
of the automobile in which he had been riding, and because it was
searched immediately after his arrest.103 In supporting this holding,
Justice Stewart principally relied on two prior cases: Chimel v. California'0 1 and United States v. Robinson.20 5
Chimel was cited for the proposition that a search incident to
arrest may be no broader than necessary to protect the arresting of-

ficer and preserve evidence. 06 In Chimel, the Court delineated the
boundaries of a reasonable search as the arrestee's person and the
area within his or her immediate control. Immediate control was
might gain
construed as "the area from within which [the arrestee]
'0 7
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.' 1
Robinson held that police may lawfully search the person of an
arrestee, even if the arrest is for a traffic violation, and that the
search may extend to all items found on the person.' 08 It was cited in
Belton for the principle that since the search of a person under law100. 101 S. Ct. at 2854 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
101. Justice Rehnquist concurred in the judgment, id. at 2851 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment), as did Justice Stevens, id. at 2865 (Stevens, J. concurring in the judgment). Justices Brennan and White wrote separate opinions. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting); id.
at 2870 (White, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall joined in both dissenting opinions.
102. 101 S. Ct. at 2865.
103. Id.
104. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
105. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
106. 101 S. Ct. at 2862-63 (citing Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762). "'The scope of [a] search
must be "strictly tied to and justified by" the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible.'" Id. (quoting Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19

(1968))).
107. 395 U.S. at 763.
108. 414 U.S. at 236.
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ful custodial arrest is reasonable per se - the fact of arrest giving
rise to the right to search - the issue of whether either of the justifications for the search incident to arrest exception was actually present should not be litigated in each case. 10
Justice Stewart reviewed Chimel and Robinson and noted a
split in the circuits as to the permissible scope of a search incident to
arrest of individuals inside a car.110 He then observed that "articles
inside the relatively narrow compass of the passenger compartment
of an automobile are in fact generally, even if not inevitably,
within""11 the Chimel grab area. Moreover, since the intrusion occasioned by an arrest temporarily overrides any privacy interests of the
arrestee, any expectation of privacy in articles located within the
grab area-the passenger compartment of the car-is similarly overridden and consequently subject to a warrantless search.112 Justice
Stewart answered the argument that the search of Belton's jacket
was invalid under Chadwick and Sanders18 by pointing out, first,
that the search in Chadwick occurred well after the arrest and therefore could not be upheld as a search incident to arrest,11 4 and, second, that the search incident to arrest exception was explicitly not at
issue in Sanders.""
Justice Rehnquist joined the opinion since the majority was unwilling to override the exclusionary rule.11 6 Justice Stevens concurred
in the judgment only. He felt that Robbins and Belton should have
been decided the same way and for the same reason; that in both
cases the search should have been upheld under the automobile ex1 17
ception to the warrant clause.
109.
110.

101 S. Ct. at 2863 (citing Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235).
101 S. Ct. at 2863.

111.

Id. at 2864.

112.

Id. Justice Stewart defined a searchable container as "any object capable of hold-

ing another object." Id. at 2864 n.4. This definition includes "luggage, boxes, bags, clothing
and the like," in addition to glove compartments or consoles. Id.
113. Id. at 2864-65. The New York Court of Appeals reasoned that since the automobile could have been easily guarded, its occupants were under arrest and a safe distance from
the vehicle, removal to the police station was imminent, and the jacket was in the policeman's
exclusive control with no reasonable possibility that the arrestee could or would have reached
for it, a search warrant should have been obtained. People v. Belton, 50 N.Y.2d 447, 452, 407
N.E.2d 420, 423, 429 N.Y.S.2d 574, 577 (1980).
114. 101 S. Ct. at 2865 (quoting Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 15); see Preston v. United

States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964)(searches "remote in time and placd from the arrest" are
unconstitutional).
115. 101 S. Ct. at 2865 (citing Sanders, 442 U.S. at 764 n.ll).
116. Id. (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
117. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
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Justice Brennan dissented on the ground that the search incident to arrest exception under Chimel ceases to apply at the "point
there is no possibility that the arrestee could reach weapons or contraband." '1 8 He contended that in its attempt to fashion simple
rules, the Court had adopted the fiction that the passenger compartment of the automobile is always within the arrestee's immediate
control.11 9 This fiction, Justice Brennan argued, was unsupported by
the facts of Belton as analyzed by the New York Court of Appeals. 12 0 He noted, moreover, that the exception carved out by the
Court could have been applied even if Trooper Nicot had handcuffed
the arrestees and extended his search to locked luggage, a result he
deemed inconsistent with past cases. 121 Finally, Justice Brennan argued that the bright line test enunciated by the majority was illusory
in that it left a number of questions unresolved and provided no principles by which to resolve them. These questions included the allowable time period between an arrest and a search,12 2 whether the warrantless search of an automobile interior conducted incident to an
arrest is valid when probable cause to arrest arises after the arrestees
have left the car,123 whether the Belton holding should be limited to
automobiles, 124 and how to measure the physical boundaries of the
interior or "passenger compartment of an automobile."12
Justice White separately dissented on the ground that the
Court's holding extended Chimel to extreme limits. 12 6 In particular,
he found unacceptable the fishing expeditions into luggage permitted
under Belton without any probable cause to believe that the luggage
12
contains contraband. 7
FOURTH AMENDMENT CONTAINER SEARCHES

Three major lines of cases were implicated in the Robbins and
Belton decisions: the automobile exception, the luggage cases, and
118. Id. at 2867 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
119. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 2867-68 (Brennan, J., dissenting)(citing People v. Belton, 50 N.Y.2d 447,
452 n.2, 407 N.E.2d 420, 423 n.2, 429 N.Y.S.2d 574, 577 n.2 (1980)).
121. Id. at 2868 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 2869 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
123. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
124. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
125. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). The status of a hatchback automobile is also in doubt
as to the primary question of what is the trunk and what is the passenger compartment. But
see note 311 infra.
126. 101 S. Ct. at 2870 (White, J., dissenting).
127. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
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the search incident to arrest exception. Although these doctrines
were necessarily tduched upon in the discussion of the Court's rationale, this section explores the doctrines in greater detail and examines how they are affected by Robbins and Belton.
The Automobile Exception
The roots of the automobile exception 12 8 can be traced back to
Carroll v. United States."2" Carroll involved the warrantless search
of an automobile upon probable cause that it contained illegal liquor.
The search resulted in the seizure of contraband which had been
hidden in the upholstery of the automobile.130 After noting that the
Court had historically distinguished searches of movable vehicles
from searches of immobile locations for fourth amendment purposes, 13 ' the Court balanced the interest of law enforcment officials
in being able to search and seize contraband 3 2 against the interest
of individuals in "free passage without interruption or search."13S
This balancing resulted in the holding that the necessity of an immediate seizure of contraband from an easily movable vehicle outweighed the driver's right to travel freely. 3 The Court reasoned
that if a warrant were to be required in such situations, the contraband in the automobile might be removed or destroyed before it
135
could be lawfully seized.
Confusion remained, however, as to when a warrantless search
of an automobile could take place. The problem centered around the
statement in Carroll that "[i]n cases where the securing of a warrant is reasonably practicable, it must be used."1 36 This confusion
was alleviated to some extent when the Court, in Chambers v. Maroney,1 37 held that if the search of an automobile was permissible at
the time of the seizure, then the right to search extended to a subsequent warrantless search of the automobile at the police station.13 8
The rationale of this holding was two-fold. First, the Court noted
128. See gdnerally Note, WarrantlessSearches and Seizures of Automobiles, 87
L. REv. 835 (1974); text accompanying notes 51-53 supra.
129. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
130. Id. at 136.
131. Id. at 153.
132. Id. at 156.
133. Id. at 154.
134. Id. at 153.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
138. Id. at 52.
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that a search of the automobile at the time of the stop might be
"impractical and perhaps not safe for the officers," 139 and, second,
the Court found "no difference [for constitutional purposes] between
on the one hand seizing and holding a car before presenting the
probable cause issue to a magistrate and, on the other, carrying out
an immediate search without a warrant."140 Two years later, however, in Coolidge v. New Hampshire," the Court held that if there
was no real possibility that the automobile was going to be moved,
then the automobile exception could not be invoked to justify a warrantless search.14 2 Therefore, because the defendant in that case had
been under observation,143 the automobile had remained immobile in
the driveway,14 4 and a warrant to search the automobile, albeit invalid, had been obtained," 5 mobility was not a problem and the police
could have and should have obtained a valid search warrant.' The
Court concluded that "[tihe word 'automobile' is not a talisman in
whose presence the Fourth Amendment fades away and disappears."
The relevance of mobility as a justification for warrantless
searches has been questioned on the ground that insofar as the automobile's occupants and the automobile itself are in custody, the automobile is de facto immobilized." 8 Moreover, warrantless searches
of automobiles not actually in motion have been upheld under the
automobile exception."' While this might imply that the "potential
139. Id. at 52 n.10.
140. Id. at 52. The Court adverted to the "lesser intrusion" concept, which holds that
only immobilization should be allowed until a warrant is obtained. The Court rejected this
approach, however, noting that "which is the 'greater' and which is the 'lesser' intrusion is
itself a debatable question and the answer may depend on a variety of circumstances." Id. at
51-52.
141. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
142. Id. at 460.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 447.
146. Id. at 462. But see id. at 505 (Black, J., dissenting)(majority's rationale depended
upon faulty assumptions that defendant's wife could be refused entry to house and automobile,
and that nobody else had any motivation to remove automobile).
147. Id. at 461-62.
148. See Wilson, The Warrantless Automobile Search: Exception Without Justification, 32 HASTINGS L. J. 127, 132 (1980).
149. See, e.g., Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938)(warrantless search permissble after automobile had been parked and driver was leaVing); Husty v. United States, 282
U.S. 694 (1931)(warrantless search permissible after automobile has been under observation,
and after driver has entered it but before automobile was actually in motion).
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mobility of the car was sufficient,"' 150 the automobile in Coolidge was
certainly potentially mobile.15 ' It therefore seems as though mobility
alone is an insufficient justification for the automobile exception.
Another justification advanced by the Court for the automobile
exception is that contraband in an automobile is often in the plain
view of police who come into contact with the automobile for noncriminal purposes. 5 2 In addition, "[a]utomobiles, unlike homes, are
subjected to pervasive and continuing governmental regulation
and controls, including periodic inspection and licensing requirements." 53 For these reasons, the reduced expectation of privacy in
an automobile may justify a warrantless search.'l 5
While the automobile exception was a major point of dispute in
Robbins, its role in the Belton decision was much less clear. At least
for the moment, it is clear that under Sanders and Robbins containers found in an automobile are not automatically submitted to a warrantless search under the automobile exception. Yet, one may ask
why containers within an automobile may not be searched while a
locked trunk, 55 a locked glove compartment, 15 and the upholstery
of an automobile 57 are all subject to a warrantless search under the
exceptidn? One answer is that the trunk, glove compartment, and
upholstery, as integral parts of the automobile, retain the same mobility as the automobile. 58 As noted above, however, mobility alone
is an insufficient justification for the automobile exception. 5 9 If the
rationale of the automobile exception is that the automobile has less
of an expectation of privacy than luggage, it is still unclear why one
has less expectation of privacy in a locked trunk or glove compartment than in a paper bag. When an individual places an object in
150.

Note, supra note 128, at 842; cf. 101 S. Ct. at 2853 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)

("automobiles are inherently mobile").
151. As observed earlier, see note 149 supra,searches of automobiles have been upheld
where the possibility of mobility is remote. See Chambers, 399 U.S. 42 (automobile searched
while at police station); Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968)(search of impounded
automobile at precinct); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967) (automobile searched one

week after defendant had been arrested).
152.
153.
154.
155.
(1973).
156.
157.
158.

E.g., Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 442 (1973).
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976).
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1977).
Robbins v. California, 101 S. Ct. 2841 (1981); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433
Cf. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976)(inventory search).
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159, 1194 n.103 (D.C. Cir. 1981)(Wilkey, J.,

dissenting).
159.

See text accompanying notes 148-151 supra.
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the locked trunk or glove compartment of an automobile, he or she
has manifested an expectation of privacy perhaps greater than if the
object had simply been placed in a paper or plastic bag. Moreover,
reasonable persons could surely differ as to which of these items-a
locked trunk or a paper bag-should be deemed a repository of personal effects or generally more open to public view.
Also unanswered in Robbins is the vitality of Chief Justice Burger's distinction between probable cause that a particular container
holds contraband, and probable cause that contraband is located
somewhere within an automobile.160 While in Sanders the Chief Justice was unwilling to decide in which of the situations a warrant is
more necessary,""1 Robbins provided an opportunity to decide the issue. That is, while the locus of the probable cause in Sanders and
Chadwick was the luggage-the connection between the luggage and
the automobile being "purely coincidental" 16 -- Robbins differed
from Sanders precisely because no probable cause to believe that the
plastic bags contained marihuana existed before the stop and
search.16 3
It is clear, however, that the Belton majority did not utilize the
automobile exception to uphold the search of Belton's zippered jack1 65
et,'" but relied instead on the search incident to arrest exception.
Indeed, there is very little in the Belton rationale that limits the
holding to automobiles with regard to allowing the warrantless
search of a container within the fictional grab area regardless of the
160. As noted in Chief Justice Burger's concurrence in Sanders:
This case simply does not present the question of whether a warrant is required
before opening luggage when the police have probable cause to believe contraband is
located somewhere in the vehicle, but when they do not know whether, for example,
it is inside a piece of luggage in the trunk, in the glove compartment, or concealed
in some part of the car's structure.
442 U.S. at 767 (Burger, C.J., concurring); see State v. Bible, 389 So.2d 42, 46-47 (La. 1980),
vacated, 101 S. Ct. 3153 (1981); 11 SETON HALL L. REV. 121, 132 (1980).
161. 442 U.S. at 768 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
162. Id. at 768 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
163. Arguably, however, Robbins' statement [w]hat you are looking for is in the back,"
Brief for Petitioner at 6, gave specific probable cause to search the trunk. Nonetheless, the
specific probable cause is far more attenuated than in Chadwick or in Sanders where specific
probable cause existed that a particular container held contraband. See notes 180-200 infra
and accompanying text.
164. Justice Stevens would have used the automobile exception to uphold searches in
both cases. See Belton, 101 S. Ct. at 2865 (Stevens, J.,
concurring); Robbins, 101 S.Ct. at
2855 (Stevens, J.,dissenting).
165. See 101 S. Ct. at 2862-65.
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arrestee's ability to reach it.166 That is, if the rationale of Belton is
that containers are "generally, even not if inevitably" within the
grab area,16 7 the same must be said of luggage carried by an individual as he walks down the street. Similarly, nothing that distinguishes
an automobile from other places-mobility, travelling in the open,
pervasive regulation-affects the scope of the grab area. Nevertheless, as will be demonstrated shortly,""8 to extend the search incident
to arrest exception to luggage within the exclusive control of the police and outside the grab area of the individual would require a reinterpretation of Chadwick and an overruling of Chimel.16 9 If one assumes that the custodial arrest of an individual walking along the
street would not justify a warrantless search of the luggage he or she
is carrying, the automobile must be viewed as taking on talismanic
qualities for the purposes of the search incident to arrest
exception.' °
The Luggage Cases
Modern law relating to the search of luggage is rooted in the
seminal case of Katz v. United States,17 1 which held that a warrantless wiretap of a public telephone booth violated the fourth amendment.11 2 Noting that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places," 11 3 the Supreme Court shifted the focus of fourth amendment analysis from the government intrusion into a place and
whether the place was endowed with an expectation of privacy, 74 to
whether or not the individual legitimately expected or sought to preserve privacy in the place searched. Accordingly, when Katz shut the
door of the public telephone booth and deposited the toll money, he
manifested a legitimate belief that his conversation would remain
166. Id. at 2867 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 2869.
168. See text accompanying notes 303-307 infra.
169. Id.
170. But see Moylan, supra note 52, at, 1015:
The point is that the automobile is simply the coincidental locus in which we apply
a Chimel analysis and not a crucial factor calling for some special analysis of its
own under Carroll.Carroll,which deals with the warrantless search of an automobile as the search of the automobile, has nothing whatsoever to do with the coincidental fact that an automobile may fall within a Chimel perimeter under "search
incident" law.
171. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
172. Id. at 359.
173. Id. at 351.
174. 'See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512-13 (1961)(Douglas, J.,
concurring).
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private.1 7 5
Justice Harlan, concurring in Katz, highlighted this reformulated mode of analysis by enunciating a two-fold prerequisite to
fourth amendment protection. 7 First, the individual must exhibit a
subjective expectation of privacy; that is, he must manifest an actual
belief that he regards the place or thing as private.1 7 Second, this
expectation of privacy must be objectively reasonable; it must be
clear that "society is prepared" to recognize the expectation as reasonable.17 Overall, Katz can be reduced to "a value judgment. It is
whether, if the particular form of surveillance practiced by the police
is permitted to go unregulated by constitutional restraints, the
amount of privacy and freedom remaining to citizens would be diminished to a compass inconsistent with the aims of a free and open
17
' 9
society.
This value judgment was adopted in the two major luggage
cases preceding Robbins-Chadwick and Sanders18 0 In Chadwick,
Federal agents were notified by railroad officials that two suspected
drug dealers had placed a suspicious and heavy footlocker onto a
train in San Diego.1"" When the train arrived in Boston the suspects
and their footlocker were watched, and a specially trained dog signalled the presence of marihuana. The two suspects were joined by
Chadwick and the three of them lifted the footlocker into Chadwick's waiting automobile. 2 At that point, with the trunk of the
automobile still open and the car engine off, the agents moved in and
arrested all three men.' 8 3 The footlocker was taken to the Federal
175. 389 U.S. at 352.
176. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J.,concurring).
177. Id. (Harlan, J.,concurring). In United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971), Justice Harlan downplayed the importance of the subjective element, noting that the Katz analysismust "transcend the search for subjective expectations." Id. at 786 (Harlan, J.,dissenting);
accord, Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 384
(1974).
178. 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). But see generally Note, From Private
Places to PersonalPrivacy: A Post Katz Study of Fourth Amendment Protection,43 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 968, 983 (1968)(people may have objective reasonable expectation of privacy which
society may find unjustifiable), quoted in 1 W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.1, at 231
(1978).

179. Amsterdam, supra note 177, at 403. This value judgment has been criticized both
as "a perfectly impossible question," id., and as "a tautology." 1 W. Lafave, supra note 178,
§ 2.1(d), at 233.
180. See text accompanying notes 58-62 supra.
181. 433 U.S. at 3.
182. Id. at 4.
183. Id.
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Building and opened without a warrant ninety minutes after it had
been seized, and outside the presence of the defendants.""
The Supreme Court invalidated this search, holding that luggage carries a substantially greater expectation of privacy than an
automobile and, hence, is not as readily subject to a warrantless
searh.185 The Court again rejected the argument that the warrant
clause protected "only interests traditionally identified with the
home"18 6 and, citing Katz, held that the fourth amendment "protects
people from unreasonable government intrusions into their legitimate
expectation of privacy." 187 The expectation of privacy in Chadwick
had been manifested by placing the contents inside a double-locked
footlocker.188 Therefore, in the absence of an exigency, a warrant
was required before the footlocker could be opened.189 The Court, as
noted earlier, 190 reasoned that luggage, unlike the automobile, is a
common "repository of personal effects," 191 the contents of which are
neither open to public view nor subject to regular inspection or offi19 2
cial scrutiny.
Justice Blackmun, dissenting in Chadwick, contended that the
police could have assured the validity of the warrantless search of
the footlocker at the Federal Building merely by postponing "the arrest just a few minutes longer until the respondents started to drive
away,"193 thereby bringing the search within the automobile exception. A number of lower courts subsequently followed Justice Blackmun's cue and distinguished Chadwick from cases where an automobile was lawfully stopped on the ground that the automobile in
194
Chadwick was never in motion prior to the seizure.
184. Id. at 4-5.
185. Id. at 13.
186. Id. at 6.
187. Id. at 7 (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 351).
188. Id. at 11.
189. Id.
190. See text accompanying notes 60, 152-154 supra.
191. 433 U.S. at 13.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 22-23 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan disputed this contention,
asserting that it is "not at all obvious" that a legal search could have been made if respondents
had begun to drive off. Id. at 16-17 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun also suggested that the police could have searched the footlocker at the time of the seizure as a search
incident to arrest, Id. at 23 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
194. E.g., United States v. Finnegan, 568 F.2d 637, 641 (9th Cir. 1977)(luggage found
inside of moving automobile may be searched without warrant if it appears from totality of
circumstances that probable cause exists to search luggage, and that exigent circumstances are
presented by moving automobile); accord,United States v. Tramunti, 513 F.2d 1087, 1104-05
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In Sanders, however, the Court ruled that the warrant requirement applies to "personal luggage taken from an automobile to the
same degree it applie[s] to such luggage in other locations. ' 19 5 In
Sanders, police received word that two individuals would be flying
into an airport with a green suitcase containing marihuana. Two
such individuals did arrive when scheduled and claimed a green suitcase. The suspects left the airport in a taxi with the suitcase in the
trunk. The taxi was stopped by the police, who opened the trunk and
searched the suitcase.1 96 While upholding and commending the
search of the automobile and the seizure of the suitcase,197 the Sanders Court ruled that the suitcase should have been held at the police
station until a search warrant had been obtained. The Court found
that the state had failed to prove the necessity of allowing a warrantless search of everything found in an automobile as well as of the
automobile itself.198 The Court went on to note that insofar as luggage, unlike an automobile, can be quickly and effectively reduced to
the exclusive control of the police, the exigencies accompanying the
search of an automobile do not extend to searches of luggage contained therein.199 Further, the fact that the suitcase in Sanders was
unlocked and unusually small did not "alter its fundamental character as a repository for personal, private effects. 200
Justice Blackmun again dissented, this time on the ground that
the Sanders decision mandated non-sensical,2 0 1 "inherently opaque"
line-drawing between containers which can and cannot be characterized as repositories of personal effects,202 and therefore provided police with little guidance as to when a container could be searched
without a warrant. 03 He argued that an officer approaching an auto(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 832 (1975); United States v. Frick, 490 F.2d 666, 669-70

(5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 831 (1974); United States v. Evans, 481 F.2d 990, 994
(9th Cir. 1973). Contra, United States v. Stevie, 582 F.2d 1175, 1178-79 (8th Cir. 1978)(en
banc) (individual's expectation of privacy in contents of luggage inures to luggage itself, and
it is irrelevant whether luggage is inside or outside of automobile), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 911
(1979); Sanders v. State, 262 Ark. 595, 599-601, 559 S.W.2d 704, 706-07 (1977)(individual's

expectation of privacy in personal luggage is "substantially greater than in an automobile"),
affd, 442 U.S. 753 (1979).

195.

442 U.S. at 766.

196.

Id. at 755.

197.

Id. at 761.

198.

Id. at 763.

199. Id. at 763-66.
200. Id. at 762 n.9.
201.

Id. at 772 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

202.

Id. at 771 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

203.

Id. at 772 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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mobile is forced to
divide the world of personal property into three groups. If there is
probable cause to arrest the occupants . . . he may search objects
within the occupants' -immediate control, with or without probable
cause. If there is probable cause to search the automobile itself,
then . . . the entire interior area of the automobile may be
searched, with or without a warrant. But under Chadwick and the
present case, if any suitcase-like object is found in the car outside
the immediate control area of the occupants, it cannot be searched,
2
in the absence of exigent circumstances, without a warrant. 04
Justice Blackmun asked how the police or the courts, when faced
with an automobile trunk containing "an orange crate, a lunch bucket, an attache case, a duffelbag, a cardboard box, a backpack, a
totebag, and a paper bag," 20 5 could be expected to decide which
items were subject to immediate search.
In fact, lower courts undertook precisely this analysis, holding
that a briefcase,2 06 a duffel bag, 207 a backpack,20 8 and a totebag 09
were common repositories of personal, private effects, and could
therefore not be searched without a warrant unless such a search
was conducted as incident to a lawful arrest 210 or in the face of exigent circumstances. 211 On the other hand, the lunchbox, 1 2 paper
bag,21 3 and plastic bag 214 were generally not viewed as repositories of
204. Id. at 771 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)(citation omitted).
205. Id. at 772 (Blackmun, J.,dissenting).
206. See, e.g., United States v. Presler, 610 F.2d 1206 (4th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Schleis, 582 F.2d 1166 (8th Cir. 1978); Shingleton v. State, 39 Md. App. 527, 387 A.2d 1134
(Ct. Spec. App. 1978).
207. See United States v. Johnson, 588 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1979).
208. See United States v. Meier, 602 F.2d 253 (10th Cir. 1979).
209. See, e.g., United Sates v. Benson, 631 F.2d 1336 (8th Cir. 1980), vacated, 101 S.
Ct. 3153(1981); People v. Minjares, 24 Cal. 3d 410, 591 P.2d 514, 153 Cal. Rptr. 224, cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 887 (1979).
210. See notes 261-314 infra and accompanying text.
211. See, e.g., United States v. Moschetta, 646 F.2d 955 (5th Cir. 1981)(warrantless
search of briefcase in trunk justified where reason to believe spring-gun located therein);
United States v. Portillo, 633 F.2d 1313 (9th Cir. 1980)(suspicion by policeman standing on
busy Freeway in presence of two handcuffed, inebriated suspected felons that gun is in trunk),
cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1764 (1981).
212. Cf. United States v. Markland, 635 F.2d 174 (2d Cir. 1980) (zippered beverage
bag in and of itself does not manifest expectation of privacy), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 2332
(1981).
213. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 635 F.2d 1207 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Mackey, 626 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Jiminez, 626 F.2d 39, 41 (7th Cir.
1980)(holding that while circumstances in those cases did not indicate that bags were being
used as repositories of personal effects, other sets of facts could have compelled different re-
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personal effects, although a warrant might be required where the
owner of such an item
takes additional steps that manifest an expec21 5
tation of privacy.
In United States v. Ross,216 however, where the issue before the
Court was whether Sanders established a worthy container rule - a
rule limiting the expectation of privacy to luggage only, and not to
"smaller, less solid, or less durable [containersl" 2117 --the District of
Columbia Circuit implicitly rejected the Katz analysis, holding that
the fourth amendment warrant requirement "forbids the warrantless
opening of a closed, opaque paper bag to the same extent that it
forbids the warrantless opening of a small unlocked suitcase or a
zippered leather pouch." 218 In invalidating the warrantless search of
a closed but unsealed paper bag located in the trunk of an automobile, the Ross court rejected the government's proposed unworthy
container rule as discriminatory in "[en]snar[ing] those without the
means or the sophistication to use worthy containers,"'1 and as being too fraught with fine distinctions to guide the police.22 0 To this
extent, the Ross Court agreed with Justice Blackmun's dissenting
opinion in Sanders. 21 Ross, however, drew a bright line in the opposults), vacated, 101 S. Ct. 3152 (1981). But see United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159 (D.C.
Cir.)(en bane), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3265 (U.S. Oct. 13, 1981)(No. 80-2209). For a
discussion of Ross, see text accompanying notes 216-233 infra.
214. See, e.g., Flynn v. State, 374 So. 2d 1041 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979). Compare
United States v. Mannino, 635 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1980)(location of bag on front seat of car
and in plain view indicative of no expectation of privacy) and United States v. Gooch, 603
F.2d 122 (10th Cir. 1979)(nature and quality of plastic bags indicative of cargo rather than
personal luggage) with United States v. Rivera, 486 F. Supp. 1025 (N.D. Tex. 1980)(sealed
opaque bags manifest an expectation of privacy) and Liichow v. State, 288 Md. 502, 419 A.2d
1041 (1980)(defendant's use of plastic bags while moving into new residence indicative of use
as repository of personal effects).
215. For a discussion of container searches under Chadwick and Sanders, see Note,
Warrantless ContainerSearches Under the Automobile and Search Incident Exceptions, 9
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 185, 192-202 (1980). See generally United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159,
1178 nn.5 & 6 (Tamm, J.,dissenting).
216. 655 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir.)(en bane), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Oct.
13, 1981)(No. 80-2209).
217. Id. at 1160.
218. Id. at 1161.
219. Id. at 1170; see United States v. Ross, No. 79-1624, slip. op. at 13-14 (D.C. Cir.
April 17, 1980)(Bazelon, J., dissenting), rev'd on rehearing,655 F.2d 1159 (1981). Judge
Bazelon, in dissent, noted that "in some of our subcultures paper bags are often used to carry
intimate personal belongings. And the sight of some of our less fortunate citizens carrying
their belongings in brown paper bags is too familiar to permit such class biases to diminish
protection of privacy." Id. at 14 (Bazelon, J.,dissenting).
220. 655 F.2d at 1170.
221. 442 U.S. at 772 (Blackmun, J.,dissenting).
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site extreme from Justice Blackmun's. While Justice Blackmun
would have permitted the warrantless search of any parcel, package,
or luggage located inside a lawfully stopped automobile,222 Ross held
that a warrant was required before searching any closed opaque bag
located in an automobile. 223 Since an unworthy container rule would
punish those individuals without the means to purchase worthy containers and would "destroy the coherence of a well-established, clear,
eminently manageable rule that, absent special necessity, a search
must rest upon a search warrant," 224 the Ross court found the
search of the paper bag to be unconstitutional. Such a result, the
court held, was mandated by Sanders' limited list of the particular
'types of containers that would justify an immediate search.225
Judge Tamm, dissenting, applied the Katz test to Ross' paper
bag and found that the bag was supported by neither objective 226 nor
subjective 227 expectations of privacy. First, Judge Tamm discussed
whether a paper bag is normally a repository of personal effects insofar as society associates a paper bag with an expectation of privacy. 228 After reviewing the precedents,2 29 and after finding that, unlike luggage, "[p]aper bags offer at best only minimal protection
against accidental or deliberate intrusions [and] are not inevitably
associated with the expectation of privacy, ' 230 Judge Tamm considered whether under the facts of the case Ross had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the paper bag.231 Finding no indication that
the bag was used to carry personal effects,232 Judge Tamm concluded that the general vulnerability of paper bags coupled with the
reasonable belief that Ross' bag was not use to store intimate objects, should have operated to validate the warrantless search of the
23 3
bag.
Since Ross and Robbins are factually similar and involve the
222.
223.

Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
655 F.2d at 1161.

224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Id. at 1170.
Id. (citing Sanders, 442 U.S. at 765 n.13).
655 F.2d at 1177-78 (Tamm, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1178 (Tamm, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1177 (Tamm, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1174-77 (Tamm, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1177 (Tamm, J., dissenting)(emphasis added).
Id. at 1178 (Tamm, J., dissenting).

232.

Indicia suggested by Judge Tamm would have included the finding of the bags

among suitcases or conventional luggage or Ross having sealed the bag shut. Id. at 1178 n.6
(Tamm, J., dissenting).
233. Id. at 1178 (Tamm, J., dissenting).
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same issues of law,234 the criticisms of Ross are equally applicable to
the Robbins holding. In this regard, Judge Tamm's opening remark
that the Ross majority was "sensitive to theory but insensitive to
reality" 23 5 is only a half truth. In fact, the Ross and Robbins decisions alike demonstrate a marked insensitivity to both reality and the
theoretical underpinnings of Katz and its progeny. To this end, one
searches Robbins in vain for the application of an expectation of privacy test. Instead, the plurality simply states that once contents are
placed within a closed, opaque container, an individual has thereby
"reasonably 'manifested an expectation that the contents would remain free from public examination.' "26 Such a statement, without
more, replaces analysis with boilerplate and retreats from the Katz
doctrine recently adhered to in Rakas v. Illinois237 and Rawlings v.
Kentucky. 8 In those cases, the issue of whether one has standing to
contest a search revolves around the concept that "[o]nly legitimate
expectations of privacy are protected by the Constitution. ' 2 3 9 The
following factors are therefore relevant to the analysis: "the precautions taken to preserve privacy, the manner in which the person
claiming fourth amendment protection has used the place or item
searched, the treatment accorded that place or item at the time the
Framers adopted the fourth amendment, and finally, the applicable
property rights. ' 24' No such analysis was made by the Robbins
plurality.
234. Recognizing that Ross could not be reversed without overruling Robbins, the Supreme Court had asked the petitioner to brief the question of "whether the Court should reconsider Robbins v. California." United States v. Ross, 50 U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Oct. 13,
1981)(No. 80-2209). But see Virgin Islands v. Rasool, 657 F.2d 582, 593 (3d Cir.
1981)(dicta)(distinguishing plastic parcel in Robbins from unsealed paper grocery bag, finding
latter supported by lesser expectation of privacy notwithstanding opaqueness); United States v.
Martino, No. 81-1009, slip op. at 5292-93 (2nd Cir. Nov. 5, 1981); United States v. Mefford,
658 F.2d 592, 593 (8th Cir. 1981); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 8 n.7, Ross (distinguishing Robbins and Ross on grounds of retroactivity issue, question of whether contents
were divulged from outward appearance, and fact that bag in Ross was unsealed).
235. 655 F.2d at 1171 (Tamm, J., dissenting).
236.

101 S. Ct. at 2846 (quoting Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 11).

237.

439 U.S. 128 (1978). Rakas held that a legitimate expectation of privacy must be

shown in order to have standing to contest a warrantless search of the glove compartment or

passenger area of an automobile. But see Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960)(automatic standing to contest warrantless search where defendant is legitimately on premises).
238.

448 U.S. 98, 104-05 (1980)(contrasting Chadwick and Katz as cases where defen-

dants took normal precautions to preserve their privacy, and noting that petitioner in Rawlings
actually stated that "he had no subjective expectation" of privacy).
239. Rakas, 439 U.S. 128, 151 (1978)(Powell, J., concurring).
240. Ross, 655 F.2d at 1173 (Tamm, J., dissenting)(citing Rakas, 439 U.S. at 152-53

(1978)(Powell, J., concurring)).
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In addition, the Robbins rationale is not compelled by either
Chadwick or Sanders. In Chadwick, the container at issue was a
double-locked, 200-pound footlocker, while the issue in Sanders was
limited to personal luggage. The Sanders Court specifically noted
that difficulties would necessarily accompany a determination of
which containers would require a warrant and which would not. 241
Presumably, these difficulties are to be worked out by the lower
courts on a case by case, container by container basis.24 2 In fact, the
Court stated that "not all containers . . . will deserve the full protection of the Fourth Amendment. '' 24 3 While the Robbins plurality

argued that the examples listed in Sanders were meant to be exclusive as "the very model of exceptions which prove the rule" 244-- cases
in which the container "clearly announce[s] its contents"S 4 -- it was
clear that under Sanders at least some containers would remain
unprotected.
Moreover, it seems factually untenable to accord an expectation
of privacy to a Dixie cup or an- unenclosed paper bag. It seems unrealistic to assume that an individual has an expectation of privacy
in such items or that society ought to recognize such an expectation
as legitimate. In this regard, it cannot be forgotten that in exchange
for the negligible, if any, expectation of privacy, highly probative
evidence of criminal activity is going to be suppressed. While commentators on both ends of the spectrum agree that law enforcement
personnel need to be given easy-to-follow rules,246 it must be
remembered that the Court is "construing the Constitution, not writing a statute or a manual for law enforcement officers. 247
However clear the proscription on searches of.containers in an
automobile trunk appears to be, searches of opaque packages and
241. 442 U.S. at 765 n.13.
242. See id.: "There will be difficulties in determining which parcels taken from an automobile require a warrant for their search and which do not. Our decision in this case means
only that a warrant generally is required before personal luggage can be searched ..
243.
244.

Id. at 764 n.13.
101 S. Ct. at 2846. The Sanders Court found that "some containers (for example a

kit of burglar tools or a gun case) by their very nature cannot support any reasonable expectation of privacy because their contents can be inferred from their outward appearance." 442
U.S. at 764 n.13. The Court has never, however, explained what a kit of burglar tools looks
like or how it differs from any other tool box in its outward appearance.
245. 101 S. Ct. at 2847.
246. Compare LaFave, "Case-By-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures". The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 Sup. CT. REv. 127, 141 (rules governing exclusionary
rule ought to be capable of easy understanding and application) with Amsterdam, supra note
177, at 403-04 (fourth amendment must speak to police intelligibly).
247. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 768 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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containers found any place in an automobile are not necessarily foreclosed. As noted below, 48 Belton radically expanded the search incident to arrest exception. To this end, the Robbins plurality specifically commented that the state had not argued that the packages
were opened as a search incident to a lawful arrest.2 49 The Sanders
Court also specifically noted that their decision in that case involved
no consideration of the search incident to arrest exception.2 50 While
the Belton holding only encompassed the interior of the passenger
compartment and not the trunk,25 1 the applicability of the search
incident to arrest exception to the search of containers inside of the
trunk of Belton's automobile was not at issue.
In addition, the parameters of inventory searches of automobiles
have yet to be fully developed with regard to containers located
therein. 52 The inventory search is the standardized procedure of cataloguing automobiles (and the contents thereof) that have been impounded by the police.2 53 In fact, such searches are not deemed
searches at all and thus require no probable cause before they can be
conducted. 2 " Rather, the procedure is justified under the caretaking
function of the police, who may make inventories in order to protect
the owner's property while it remains in police custody, to protect
the police from claims that the property was lost or stolen while in
police custody, and to protect the police from potential danger.2 55
Any inculpatory evidence of a crime found during a lawful police
inventory is deemed to have been in plain view and, as such, admissi248. See text accompanying notes 303-309 infra.
249. 101 S. Ct. at 2847 n.3.
250. 442 U.S. at 764 n.ll.
251. 101 S. Ct. at 2864 n.4.
252. Compare United States v. Ochs, 595 F.2d 1247, 1264-65 (2d Cir. 1979)(Meskill,
J., concurring)(itemizing of contents of briefcase permissible as inventory search) and United
States v. Diggs, 544 F.2d 116, 125-27 (3d Cir. 1976)(Gibbons, J., concurring)(particular

search unreasonable due to investigatory purpose) and State v. Walker, 119 Ariz. 121, 124-27,
579 P.2d 1091, 1098-99 (1978)(upholding inventory search of automobile which included

locked truck and closed suitcase therein) with United States v. McCambridge, 551 F.2d 865,
870-71 (Ist Cir. 1977)(upholding inventory search of impounded vehicle including stolen suit-

case) and United States v. Friesen, 545 F.2d 672 (9th Cir. 1976)(upholding inventory search
of two suitcases seized from motel room during arrest), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911 (1977) and
State v. Houser, 95 Wash. 2d 193, 199-200, 622 P.2d 1218, 1225-28 (1980)(inventory of

locked trunk impermissible).
253.
254.
255.

See Moylan, supra note 52, at 1043-48; Wilson, supra note 148, at 147-52.
Moylan, supra note 52, at 1043-44.
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976); see Cady v. Dombrowski,

413 U.S. 433, 447 (1973)(threat of danger to public posed by revolver left in immobilized and
abandoned automobile).
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ble.2 56 These policies apply with equal force to containers taken from
an automobile.2 57 In fact, the case for inventories may be more compelling considering the ease with which many containers could be
removed by thieves, and because those containers most likely to contain personal effects are also most likely to contain valuables. Allowing inventories would make the most sense where the police either do
not know the identity of the owner (negating any argument that permission should be sought) or258reasonably believe that there are valuables within the automobile.
Finally, assuming the continued validity of the Sanders list of
containers clearly announcing their contents, such containers, as well
as open containers and parcels, remain subject to warrantless
searches.25 In drug cases, the doctrine of plain smell and the extent
to which it may be used in drug prosecutions may result in increased
litigation. 60
The Search Incident to Arrest Exception
Preston v. United States261 held that a warrantless search must
be contemporaneous to an arrest in order to be upheld as incident
thereto. 62 The Preston Court reasoned that searches remote in time
or place from an arrest, which serve neither to protect police nor
256.

Moylan, supra note 52, at 1044-48; cf Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 235

(1968)(per curiam)(in process of protecting car while it was in police custody, "[o]nce the
door had lawfully been opened, the registration card, with the name of the robbery victim on
it, was plainly visible").
257. As a benign procedure, however, the inventorying process must be done as part of
the caretaking function and not as an investigatory technique. The inquiry will therefore often
focus on the intent of the searching policeman. See Note, supra note 128, at 851-52.

258. Id. at 853. The doctrine of inventory, however, is not without its critics. One commentator notes the "serious threat [of] potentially limitless authority for the warrantless

search of automobiles whether impounded as instrumentalities of crime or pursuant to motor
vehicle regulations." Wilson, supra note 148, at 152. Another commentator balances the se-

curity of property with the violation of privacy, and concludes that in light of the possibility
that no property will be in the automobile, and because property is insurable while privacy is
not, "[a]s a routine matter. . . the protection of privacy is more important than the possibility
of preventing theft." Note, supra note 128, at 853.
259. Robbins, 101 S. Ct. at 2846; see text accompanying notes 73-79, 243-245 supra.
260. See, e.g., United States v. Rivera, 486 F. Supp. 1025, 1033 (N.D. Tex. 1980)(no
evidence as to "pungency of odor" such that it was "so recognizable as to negate the expecta-

tion of privacy otherwise inferrable from the use of opaque black sealed bags"); State v.
Kahlon, 172 N.J. 331, 338, 411 A.2d 1178, 1181-82 (1980)(heavy odor of marihuana, which
officer believed emanated from garbage bags in trunk, factor in permissible search), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3245 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1981)(No. 81-234).
261. 376 U.S. 364 (1964).

262. Id. at 368.
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preserve evidence, 2 6 3 are unreasonable and therefore violate the
fourth amendment. Four years later, in Chimel v. California,2e the
Court limited the permissible scope of such searches to the arrestee's
person and the area from which he or she might gain control of a
weapon or destructible evidence.2"5 In so holding, the Court overruled cases in which a one-room office2"6 and four-room 267 apartment
had been thoroughly searched incident to arrests made therein, 26 8
noting that the two primary justifications for the exception-protection of police and preservation of evidence-were adequately met by a search of this grab area.28 9 The Court reasoned
that to hold otherwise would merely give the police a pretext to
search the entire premises in which an arrest is made on something
less than probable cause by simply waiting for a suspect to go home
27 0
before making the arrest.
The Court arguably retreated from Chimel in the 1974 cases of
United States v. Robinson271 and United States v. Edwards.272
Robinson held that a warrant is not required to search the person
and personal effects of an individual placed in police custody. 273
Under the rationale of the case, the arrest itself gives rise to the
authority to search. Moreover, this authority to search is not subject
to hindsight review by a court as to the probability that a particular
arrestee possessed a weapon or evidence.27 " This issue is especially
relevant to custodial arrests for traffic violations and other activities-those not normally associated with violence or tangible evidence-where the usual justifications for a warrantless search incident to arrest are not present. 7 In Edwards, the Court upheld the
263.
264.
265.

Id. at 367-68.
395 U.S. 752 (1969).
Id. at 763; see text accompanying notes 104-107 supra.

266.
267.
268.
269.

United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1949).
Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
395 U.S. at 768.
Id. at 762-63.

270.

Id. at 767.

271.

414 U.S. 218 (1973); see text accompanying notes 105, 108 supra.

272. 415 U.S. 800 (1974). See generally Comment, Broadening The Scope Of A Search
Incident To Custodial Arrest: The Burger Court's Retreat From Chimel, 24 EMORY L. J. 151
(1975).
273. 414 U.S. at 235; see Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266 (1973).

274. 414 U.S. at 235; see Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 265-66 (1973).
275.

Both Robinson and Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973), involved arrests for

violations of motor vehicle laws. In Robinson, the defendant was stopped and arrested for
driving after the revocation of his driver's license. A body search uncovered a cigarette package which contained capsules of heroin. 414 U.S. at 223. In Gustafson, the defendant was
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post-incarceration seizure and search of a prisoner's clothes for evidence of a burglary as "no more than taking from respondent the
effects in his immediate possession that constituted evidence of [a]
crime. 278 Ruling that the right to seize and search the prisoner's
clothes existed at the time of the arrest, the Court went on to note
that the delay in the search was reasonable, and no more of an imposition than would have occurred at the time and place of the arrest. 277 Edwards clearly eroded the Preston-Chimel requirement of
contemporaneity by upholding a warrantless search conducted well
after the seizure and by providing no alternative definition regarding
the time frame in which a search must be conducted.27 8 This provided an opening for law enforcement personnel to seize containers
and search them well after the containers or their contents could be
of any danger to the police. Such searches may be upheld under the
rationale-similar to. that employed in Chambers v. Maroney 27 -- that if the search were permissible at the time of the original
seizure it would be permissible to extend the search to the police
station. 8
Chadwick mandated that the scope and intensity of a search of
luggage and other objects not intimately related to the person would
be governed by the Chimel-Preston line of cases rather than the
Robinson-Edwards line.281 In Chadwick, the state contended that a
warrantless search of an arrestee's property is proper upon probable
cause that the property contains contraband or other evidence of a
arrested for failing to have a driver's license. A search of his coat pocket revealed a cigarette
box containing marihuana cigarettes. 414 U.S. at 262.
276. 415 U.S. at 805.
277. Id. The reasonableness of the search was predicated, in part, on the fact that the
arrest took place late at night when no substitute clothing was immediately available. Since it
would have been unreasonable to confiscate Edwards' clothing and leave him "exposed in the
cell throughout the night," waiting until the next morning was viewed as a reasonable alternative. Id.
278. Id. at 810-12 (Stewart, J., dissenting); see Comment, supra note 272, at 162-63.
279. 399 U.S. 42 (1970); see id. at 52 (finding no difference between searching automobile at curbside and presenting probable cause issue to magistrate). See generally text accompanying notes 137-140 supra.
280. Edwards, 415 U.S. at 805: "[A] reasonable delay in effectuating [the seizure] does
not change the fact that [the defendant] was no more imposed upon than he could have been
at the time and place of the arrest or immediately upon arrival at the place of dentention."
281. 433 U.S. at 16 n.10. The majority distinguished the two lines on the ground that
while the expectation of privacy in a possession is not eliminated by an arrest, the intrustion
occasioned thereby does operate to reduce the expectation of privacy in the person. Id.; see text
accompanying notes 180-192 supra.
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crime. 28 2 In rejecting this argument, the Court delineated the test
that in the absence of an exigency, a warrant must be secured for
the search of personal property not immediately associated with the
person "at the point where the property to be searched comes under
the exclusive dominion of police authority."28 s The Court once again
referred to the rationale underlying the search incident to arrest exception and reasoned that where law enforcement personnel have exclusive control of an article, there no longer exists any danger that
the arrestee will gain
access to any weapon or evidence which may
28 4
be located therein.
Justice Blackmun, dissenting in Chadwick, would have combined the Robinson-Edwards rationale of allowing a search incident
to arrest of the clothing and effects of an arrestee, with the automobile exception cases.285 Under this formula, he would have held that
"a warrant is not required to seize and search any movable property
in the possession of a person properly arrested in a public place. ' 286
He would have adopted the lesser intrusion concept espoused in
Robinson, that a custodial arrest is such a great intrusion into an
individual's privacy that the ensuing search is de minimis 87 Finally,
Justice Blackmun interpreted the majority's holding to be based on a
requirement of contemporaneity;28 8 the police could have conducted
a valid warrantless search of the footlocker if they had done so at the
time and place of Chadwick's arrest, 289
while the footlocker was still
within Chadwick's immediate control.
Exactly when a search incident to arrest may be undertaken has
been the subject of numerous lower court decisions. While at least
one circuit has taken the position that the search incident to arrest
282.
283.

433 U.S. at 14.
Id. at 15.

284.

Id.

285.

Id. at 18-22 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see text accompanying notes 128-154

supra.

286. 433 U.S. at 19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
287. Id. at 20 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the demise of the lesser
intrusion doctrine and an argument for its adoption in lieu of Chadwick's reasonableness test,
see Note, United States v. Chadwick and the Lesser Intrusion Concept: The Unreasonableness
of Being Reasonable, 58 B.U. L. REv. 436 (1978).
288. 433 U.S. at 23 & n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see text accompanying notes 261263 supra.

289.

433 U.S. at 23 & n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). But see id. at 17 n.2 (Brennan, J.,

concurring). If Justice Blackmun is correct, however, the search need not have taken place

immediately after the arrest, but could rather have been carried out as soon as practicable.
Under Chambers, the search at the Federal Building might also have been permissible. See
notes 137-140 supra.
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exception disappears when an object comes under the physical control of a policeman, 9 0 other courts have minimized Chadwick's effect by narrowing the concept of the exclusive control of the police
while expanding the area considered to be within the immediate control of the arrestee. 291 This has been done by distinguishing Chadwick on the nature of the article (a bulky, 200-pound footlocker) and
the proximity of the search to the arrest (ninety minutes later, out of
the presence of the arrestees)292 Still other courts have reviewed the
particular factual circumstances to determine whether the article
was actually within a police officer's exclusive control or whether it
was within the grab area of the arrestee.2 93 Relevant variables have
included, among others,2 94 the distance between the arrestee and the
object searched,2 95 the number of policemen as compared to arrestees, 298 and whether or not, and when, the arrestee was
handcuffed. 9 7
290. See United States v. Benson, 631 F.2d 1336 (8th Cir. 1980), vacated, 101 S. Ct.
3153 (1981); United States v. Schleis, 582 F.2d 1166 (8th Cir. 1978).
291. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 605 F.2d 349 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 984 (1980); People v. De Santis, 46 N.Y.2d 82, 385 N.E.2d 577, 412 N.Y.S.2d 838
(1978), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 912 (1979).
292. See United States v. Garcia, 605 F.2d 349, 353-54 (7th Cir. 1979), cert denied,
446 U.S. 984 (1980); People v. De Santis, 46 N.Y. 2d 82, 89, 385 N.E.2d 577, 580, 412
N.Y.S.2d 838, 841-42 (1978), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 912 (1979). See generally Note, supra
note 215, at 206-11.
293. See, e.g., United States v. Griffith, 537 F.2d 900, 904 (7th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Jones, 475 F.2d 723 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 841 (1973).
294. See, e.g., United States v. Ajlouny, 476 F. Supp. 995 (E.D.N.Y. 1979)(allowing
search incident to arrest where arrestee was in close proximity to briefcase in automobile, and
arrestee same size as arresting officer), aff'd, 629 F.2d 83 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1111
(1981); State v. Welsh, 84 N.J. 346, 419 A.2d 1123 (1980)(arrest occurred while arrestee's
young child was watching; highly improbable arrestee would resist arrest, attempt to escape, or
destroy evidence).
295. See, e.g., State v. Robalewski, 418 A.2d 817 (R.I. 1980).
In determining the permissible scope of a search incident to an arrest, much depends on the particular facts of each case. . . . Although we eschew a mechanical
reliance on any single factor, we think that some approximation of the distance
between the arrestee and the object searched is fundamental to a determination of
the question of whether an object [searched] lies within an arrestee's immediate
control.
Id, at 822-23 (citations omitted).
296. See, e.g., United States v. Montano, 613 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1980)(warrantless
search of suitcase impermissible where four agents have three arrestees at bay in well-lit room,
and agents have possession of suitcase); People v. Dalton, 24 Cal. 3d 850, 857, 157 Cal. Rptr.
497, 501, 598 P.2d 467, 471 (1979)(four highway patrol cars and four policemen on scene
after defendant arrested and handcuffed), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980).
297. See, e.g., United States v. Mason, 523 F.2d 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1975)(arrestee moving
toward suitcase in closet, within grabbing distance of closet and with hands handcuffed in
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Two additional observations should be noted about the search
incident to arrest exception prior to Belton. First, Chadwick's requirement that an article once reduced to the officer's exclusive dominion and control can be searched only pursuant to a warrant 9 8
did not apply where exigent circumstances were present. For example, police were not required to reduce to their exclusive control and
bring back to the police station a container that they believed contained a bomb. 99 Second, Chadwick did not purport to apply to possessions intimately related to the person.300 Surely, under Robinson
and Edwards, clothing fell into this category.301 The issue of whether
such items as wallets, purses, and attache cases were embraced by
the intimate relationship rule was, however, left unresolved by
30 2
Chadwick.
Under Belton, however, no such inquiry is required for a search
of a container, package, or parcel located in the passenger compartment of an automobile. No exigency need be present to search even
a 200-pound footlocker if it is located in the passenger compartment
of the automobile. Whether luggage, containers, packages, and parcels are reduced to the exclusive dominion of the arresting officer
and lie outside of the grab area is now of no relevance if the items
are located in the passenger compartment. Under the Belton bright
line rule, anything "capable of holding another object" in the interior of an automobile is subject to a warrantless search incident to a
lawful arrest. 303
While seemingly clear in its application, 0 4 the fiction estabfront of him); People v. Dalton, 24 Cal. 3d 850, 857, 157 Cal. Rptr. 497, 501, 598 P.2d 467,
471 (1979)(arrestee handcuffed at time of arrest indicates that box is not within grab area),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980).
298. 433 U.S. at 15.
299. Id. at 15 n.9. As an illustration, the Court cited United States v. Johnson, 467 F.2d
630 (2d Cir. 1972), which involved the seizure and warrantless opening of two suitcases, one of

which police had probable cause to believe contained a sawed-off shotgun. Because the gun

might have been loaded, and because the police were in a "transient and high crime area," id.
at 639, the policeman's safety and the safety of others rendered the warrantless search

permissible.
300.

433 U.S. at 14-15; see text accompanying notes 271-277 supra. Why such posses-

sions are endowed with a lesser expectation of privacy than other possessions, such as a footlocker, was not explained in Chadwick. Nor does Chadwick explain how to differentiate be-

tween searches of the person and "searches of possessions within the arrestee's immediate
control." 27 DRAKE L. REV. 421, 434 (1977).
301. See text accompanying notes 265-280 supra.
302. See Note, supra note 215, at 211-14.
303. 101 S. Ct. at 2864 & n.4.
304. But see text accompanying note 125 supra and notes 310-314 infra.
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lished in Belton-that containers within the passenger compartment
of an automobile are thereby within the grab area-abandons the
limitation established in Chadwick that property within the exclusive
dominion of the police generally cannot be searched without a warrant. The rule will also result in a judicial tendency to ignore reality.
In particular, it abandons the factual determinations regarding the
type of object searched, the number of policemen present, the proximity of the arrestee to the object searched, whether the arrestee was
handcuffed at the time,305 and the degree of control exercised by the
police over the object.306 In place of these factual determinations the
Court substituted a bright line rule based on a "generalization that
articles inside the relatively narrow compass of the passenger compartment of an automobile are in fact generally, even if not inevitably, within 'the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to
grab a weapon or evidentiary item.' ",307
Constitutional doctrine should not be predicated on such generalizations. This is especially clear when the doctrine compels a finding of a valid search incident to arrest where, for example, the
search has taken place after an arrestee is handcuffed and seated in
a police car surrounded by four policemen. Certainly, in such a case,
the arrestee is unable to grab a weapon or destroy evidence. A rule
that imputes such ability as a matter of law also implies that all
individuals arrested in an automobile are "possessed of the skill of
Houdini and the strength of Hercules."30 8 Therefore, in much the
same way that the principle of expectation of privacy is eviscerated
by Robbins,30 9 the notion that a search incident to arrest is justified
by protecting the police officer and preserving destructible evidence
is undermined by a bright line rule that fails to take these justifications into account.
Even more disturbing is that Belton practically invites unscrupulous or overzealous law enforcement personnel to engage in
pretextual arrests. Under the Belton rule, police without probable
cause sufficient to obtain a search warrant for an item of property
305. See notes 294-297 supra and accompanying text.
306. See notes 290-293 supra and accompanying text.
307. 101 S. Ct. at 2864 (quoting Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763).
308. United States v. Frick, 490 F.2d 666, 673 (5th Cir. 1974)(Goldberg, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); accord, United States v. Mason, 523 F.2d 1122, 1131 (D.C.
Cir. 1975)(Bazelon, C.J., dissenting).
309. Interestingly, the search of the cookie tin found in the front seat of Robbins' car,
conceded by the California Attorney General to have been improper, would have been permissible under Belton. See notes 15, 25 supra and accompanying text.
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need only wait until a suspect has entered a car with the property
before making an arrest. The Court's eschewing of factual determinations surrounding the search, and its reluctance to second-guess
the police, will make the discovery of such searches more difficult.
Finally, the supposed clarity of the Belton rule is not so evident
after a careful reading.310 What encompasses the passenger compartment or interior of an automobile? Where does one compartment
begin and another end, for example, in a hatchback automobile?3""
Since the time in which a search can take place is no longer circumscribed by when the item in question comes into the officer's exclusive control, how soon after an arrest must the search take place?312
Additionally, as noted earlier,3 13 does the trunk of an automobile fall
within the Belton rule? If so, why? Finally, will the Belton rationale
be extended to apply to non-automobile related searches? Certainly,
luggage and other containers carried by an individual are generally
within his or her immediate control. If the justification for allowing a
search incident to arrest of objects in which an individual reposes a
substantial expectation of privacy is that the very intrustion of arrest
temporarily overrides any expectation of privacy that the individual
has in the object, such a rationale would be equally applicable to
searches incident to arrests unrelated to automobiles. As Justice
Brennan notes, the bright line rule not only fails to address these
issues, but "offers no guidance to the police officer seeking to work
out these answers for himself." 1 4
PROPOSAL AND CONCLUSION

When Robbins and Belton are read together, it is clear that the
310. See Belton, 101 S. Ct. at 2869 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
311. One commentator maintains that the entire hatchback automobile is subject to a
search incident to arrest, and has proposed plans for a "Fourth Amendment Hatchback."
Kamisar, 4th Amendment Hatchback, Washington Post, Oct. 15, 1981, at 29, col. 3. Similar
questions might also be raised about the status of motor homes. See United States v. Wiga,
662 F.2d 1325, 1332 n.9 (9th Cir. 1981)("limited search of passenger areas of motor home"
within ambit of Belton).
312. The United States Government's amicus brief appears to have supplied the rationale for the Belton opinion. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae. In that brief,
the government urged the Court to repudiate the "exclusive control" test as "fundamentally
inconsistent with traditional principles governing searches incident to a lawful arrest." Id. at
16. Instead, the government proposed at test that would allow a search incident to arrest of the
area "within the potential reach of the suspect," id. at 13, if such search is conducted "during
the period in which the arrest is being consummated and before the situation has so stabilized
that it could be said that the arrest was completed." Id. at 14.
313. See text accompanying note 251 supra.
314. 101 S.Ct. at 2869 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)(emphasis omitted).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1982

37

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 2 [1982], Art. 8
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:483

interior of an automobile and all of the contents therein may be
searched without a warrant incident to a lawful arrest.3 1 5 On the
other hand, any opaque articles whose contents are not clearly identifiable as contraband from their outward appearance may not be
searched without a warrant, absent an exigency, if the article is located in the trunk of the automobile.3 16
The following scenarios can therefore be envisioned. In case A,
two policemen pull over two suspects in a car they have probable
cause to believe has been involved in a recent drug sale. The men
alight, are arrested, and patted down. The interior of the car is
searched and heroin is found. One suspect tells the policemen that
what they are looking for is in the trunk. While one policeman
watches the suspects, the other opens the trunk and sees several
cardboard boxes. One of the boxes on the top is open just enough so
that the police officer can see a small plastic-wrapped parcel. Also in
the trunk are upside down Dixie cups, the contents of which the police. officer cannot see.
In case B, police pull over a car with a defective headlight and,
upon their approach to request the driver's license and registration,
smell marihuana. The driver is arrested, handcuffed, and placed in
the back seat of a second patrol car which has recently arrived.
While three police officers stand guard around the second police car,
a fourth begins a careful search of the passenger compartment of the
automobile. A locked combination briefcase lying on the back seat is
opened, as well as a zippered pouch locked inside the glove
compartment.
Under Robbins, the cardboard boxes, plastic-wrapped parcels,
and Dixie cups would all have to be brought back to the police station and held until a warrant to search them is secured. Under Belton, however, the locked glove compartment, zippered pouch, and
briefcase could all be searched without a warrant. An anomolous situation therefore exists: Police, with probable cause, will be unable to
conduct a warrantless search of an article found in the trunk of an
automobile; they may, however, without probable cause, search the
interior of an automobile and all of the contents thereof without having to obtain a warrant.
In addition, contrary to the proposition that "the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places," 31 under Robbins and Bel315. See notes 100-112 supra and accompanying text.
316.

See notes 43-79 supra and accompanying text.

317.

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
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ton it is the place which is protected."' In short, the automobile is
broken into two distinct parts with concomitant zones of privacy.
Thus, the relevant analysis will now focus on whether a container is
located in the trunk or passenger compartment, instead of on the
particular privacy interests of the person who has placed the
container there.
It is unlikely that the Robbins bright line test will survive the
1982-1983 Supreme Court Term. On October 13, 1981, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in United States v. Ross. 1" That
Ross could not be reversed without overruling Robbins was recognized in the order granting certiorari, wherein the Court requested
briefing and argument on the issue of whether it should reconsider
Robbins v. California.2 ' Because Justice Stewart, who wrote only
for the plurality in Robbins, has since retired,32 1 it seems likely that
the decision will be overruled.
On what ground Robbins will be overruled, if at all, remains to
be seen. To be sure, the Ross case provides a perfect opportunity to
extend the automobile exception to all objects located in the automobile. This approach was found "attractive" by Justice Powell in his
Robbins concurrence, 322 and was supported by Chief Justice Burger
when the locus of the probable cause at the time of the seizure is the
automobile generally rather than a particular container located
therein.32 3 Such an approach would provide an alternative ground for
the Belton holding and might also "provide ground for agreement by
a majority of the presently fractured Court on an approach that
would give more specific guidance to police and courts in this recurring situation--one that has led to incessant litigation."' 324 While
both clear in its application and arguably consistent with the Chadwick and Sanders holdings, however, adopting this approach would
necessarily entail a "rejection of a goqd deal of the reasoning in
[Sanders]. ,,"25 It would mandate a rejection of factual and theoretical distinctions between containers and automobiles; distinctions
318. See text accompanying notes 236-240 supra.
319. 50 U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Oct. 13, 1981)(No. 80-2209).
320. Id.
321. The vacancy created by Justice Stewart's retirement has been filled by the appointment of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor.
322. 101 S. Ct. at 2850 (Powell, J., concurring).
323. See Sanders, 442 U.S. at 767 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
324. Robbins, 101 S. Ct. at 2850 (Powell, J., concurring).
325. Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
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which are reasonable and ought to be preserved. 2
The better approach would be to analyze the search of Ross'
bag with regard to the objective and subjective manifestations of an
expectation of privacy therein. 27 Such a return to the principles underlying the fourth amendment and its exceptions would be equally
applicable to the Belton holding and should be adopted at the first
available opportunity. A new analysis should be premised on a caseby-case approach.
Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Robbins, noted that "[o]ur entire profession is trained to attack 'bright lines' the way hounds attack foxes."3 28 Justice Brennan, dissenting in Belton, criticized the
formulation of an "arbitrary 'bright line' rule."32 9 Analysis based on
a review of the facts of the cases as they arise, while prehaps leaving
some ambiguity in the case law, would tend to reduce the total num326. See text accompanying notes 190-192, 195, 199-200 supra.
327. In fact, the Government is seeking certiorari in Ross on the ground that an expectation-of-privacy test was and should have been applied to the extent that, "because paper
bags . . lack the integrity, security, and privacy attributes of luggage, they are not 'inevitably associated with the expectation of privacy' . . . 'which the law recognizes as "legitimate .... Petition for A Writ of Certiorari at 11 (quoting Sanders, 442 U.S. at 762); Rakas v.
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 144 n.12 (1978)). Additionally, the "insubstantial character of the paper . . . bag did not meaningfully differentiate its contents from the other contents of his
automobile" which the police could properly have searched without a warrant. Id. at 12. Furthermore, the government urged the Court to articulate guiding principles "in any fashion that
commands a majority of the Court." Reply Memorandum for the United States at 1; see id. at
1-2.
It should be noted that three circuit courts of appeals have already rejected the Robbins
bright line test. See United States v. Martino, 664 F.2d 860, 872-74 (2d Cir. 1981)(construing Robbins as narrowly as possible, based upon Justice Powell's concurrence in that case,
and holding that a closed but unsealed bag, absent "other objective external evidence," did not
manifest "a reasonable expectation of privacy sufficient to justify independent constitutional
protection"); United States v. Mefford, 658 F.2d 588, 592-93 (8th Cir. 1981)(characterizing
Robbins test as dictum, and holding that brown paper bag which "was not sealed. . .was not
in a car trunk, and [contents of which] could not have been easily lost or destroyed" was not
imbued with expectation of privacy); Virgin Islands v. Rasool, 657 F.2d 582, 590 (3d Cir.
1981)(dictum)(Robbins viewed as not controlling because, first, grocery bag not demonstrated
to have been closed or sealed does not "possess the same degree of 'privacy expectations' as a
sealed opaque plastic package," second, bag in Robbins was in trunk rather than interior, and
third, Robbins was plurality opinion which depended upon Justice Powell's concurrence,
"which eschew[ed] the lead opinion's rationale"). But see United States v. Weber, 664 F.2d
841 (Ist Cir. 1981)(combining broad definition of container in Belton with Robbins' bright
line teit to find search of rolled up rainslicker impermissible); Sharpe v. United States, 660
F,2d 967, 972 & n.3 (4th Cir. 1981)(search of "a tube of marijuana wrapped first in paper
bags, then in a taped plastic bag, and finally in burlap tied with twine," held invalid under
both Robbins bright line test and Powell concurrence).
328. 101 S. Ct. at 2854 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
329. Id. at 2866 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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ber of ambiguous borderline cases by encouraging police to exercise
caution and secure a search warrant whenever practicable. 330 Moreover, such an approach would make better doctrinal sense in the long
run by producing results consistent with established fourth amendment principles.
The following analysis should therefore be adopted: A
container, parcel, or package should be measured by both objective
and subjective expectations of privacy. If society is prepared to recognize a particular class of container as beholden to an expectation
of privacy, the warrantless search of the container would be illegal.
If, however, society is unprepared to make such a recognition, a warrantless search is permissible unless there is some subjective manifestation that the container is imbued with an expectation of privacy.
This could be determined either by affirmative efforts of the individual to manifest an expectation of privacy (for example, by taping,
tying, or wrapping) or by the factual situation indicating that the
container is being used as a repository of personal effects (by the
presence of clothing and/or other personal effects therein). Once the
police have reason to believe that the container is a repository of
personal effects, either through personal knowledge or by discovering
personal effects during the course of a search, the search must be
terminated until a warrant is obtained.
When a lawful arrest is made, expectation of privacy considerations must be temporarily overridden by a concern for the safety of
the arresting officer. Warrantless searches of both the person and the
area within that person's immediate control should therefore continue to be permitted when conducted incident to arrest. The scope
may also include a search of any parcels or containers within the
arrestee's immediate control provided that the search takes place at
the time of the arrest or as the arrest process continues. Once the
container has been reduced to the officer's exclusive control, however, a warrant should be required.331 Thus, the determination de330. See 655 F.2d at 1164 n.9; Id. at 1178 n.6 (Tamm, J., dissenting).
331. Contrary to the argument that the adoption of the exclusive control test would
emasculate the search incident to arrest exception because containers "will almost always be
under the 'exclusive control' of the police," Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at

15-16, Belton, such determinations would be factual rather than mechanical. The exclusive
control prong therefore provides the temporal measuring rod. Compare People v. Belton, 50

N.Y.2d 447, 452 n.2, 407 N.E.2d 420, 423 n.2, 429 N.Y.S.2d 574, 577 n.2 (1980)(nothing in
record that jackets were within reach of arrestees) with id. at 453-55, 407 N.E.2d at 423-25,
429 N.Y.S.2d at 577-79 (Gabrielli, J., dissenting)(one police officer with four suspects allowed

to make search incident to arrest insofar as neither arrestees nor property reduced to police
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pends partly on whether the arrestee could have reached the
container from the time the arrest is made to the time when either
the arrestee is secured or the container is reduced to the exclusive
control of the arresting officer. This analysis should be undertaken
from the viewpoint of the police officer making the arrest.
Finally, while the location of a container in an automobile
should have no bearing on the expectation of privacy associated
therewith, it should be one factor in the analysis of searches incident
to arrest. Stops of multi-passenger vehicles often present volatile situations. Objects located in the passenger compartment of an automobile are often, though not always, within the immediate control of
the passengers. The fluidity of an arrest and the mobility of the automobile cannot be ignored in determining whether the container is
within the exclusive control of the arresting officers.
Under this analysis, Robbins and Belton do not appear to have
been decided incorrectly. As for Robbins, society does not inevitiably
associate plastic garbage bags with an expectation of privacy. Yet,
Robbins nevertheless manifested an expectation of privacy by carefully wrapping and sealing the bag so that it essentially resembled
"an oversized, extra-long cigar box. ' ' 33 2 He thereby demonstrated
that there was something personal wrapped within the plastic which
he did not wish to show to the public. Insofar as the trial record did
not reflect that the contents were readily inferable from the outside
wrapping, and did reflect that Robbins had manifested an expectation of privacy in the container, 333 a warrant was correctly required
before searching. Belton was also correctly decided. That case involved a highway stop of an automobile carrying four unknown suspects. While the policemen did pat down the jackets for weapons, the
search incident to arrest exception is also designed to prevent the
destruction of evidence. Because the police officer could not handcuff
the arrestees before transporting the arrestees and their jackets to
the police station, 33' his search of the jackets was permissible at the
time of the arrest.
On the other hand, the Ross decision was incorrect. Paper bags,
especially of the lunch-bag variety are not associated with an expectation of privacy, but are often used to carry food or drink rather
officer's exclusive control).
332.
(Rattigan,
333.
334.

People v. Robbins, 103 Cal. App. 34, 47, 162 Cal. Rptr. 780, 785, (Ct: App. 1980)
J.,dissenting); see notes 17, 27 supra.
See note 79 supra.
See text accompanying note 31 supra.
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than items traditionally classified as personal effects. Ross himself
made no effort to demonstrate an expectation of privacy in the contents of the bag by sealing or taping the bag. 335 The police were not
aware, nor did they have reason to believe either before or during the
search, that the paper bag was being used as a repository of personal
effects. As a result, the warrantless search was conducted in a manner consistent with fundamental fourth amendment principles.
While such an analysis may seem trite and artificial, it is necessary both to remain consistent with precedent and to adhere to principles basic to our society. On the one hand, people should be afforded the opportunity of a neutral magistrate's intervention when
they have reasonably manifested an expectation of privacy in an
item to be searched. On the other hand, the safety of law enforcement officials depends upon their right to search an arrestee and the
area from which the arrestee can reach a weapon or destroy evidence, so long as it can be realistically reached.
The only way to successfully adhere to established fourth
amendment principles is to leave the fact-finding to a case-by-case
determination.3 36 Any other approach, including those mandated by
Robbins and Belton, will lead to overruling those principles. s37 The
formulation and use of artificial prophylactic rules-as espoused in
the Belton and Robbins decisions-will result in the exceptions swallowing up the rules, and will render the application of fourth amendment doctrine less sensitive to the principles behind its formulation.
Anthony E. Kaplan

335.

United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159, 1178 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1981)(Tamm, J.,

dissenting).

336. One commentator has suggested that the formulation of bright line rules in the
fourth amendment context is primarily due to a "distrust of state-court factfinding in these
cases." Amsterdam, supra note 177, at 351.
337. Although not technically a fourth amendment principle, but rather a vehicle to

protect constitutional rights, there has been significant pressure for the forthright abandonment of the exclusionary rule. See, e.g., California v. Minjares, 443 U.S. 916 (1979)(Rehn-

quist, J., joined by Burger, C.J., dissenting from denial of stay); United States v. Williams,
622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980)(en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981). Such an abandonment, it is argued, would foreclose the engrafting of permutations onto the fourth amendment,

rendering it more understandable and easier to apply, while alternative civil remedies for the
citizen whose constitutional rights have been violated by the illegal search would still be avail-

able. See Minjares, 443 U.S. at 925-26 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of stay).
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